Israel’s election deadlock: Could war with Iran hand Netanyahu a lifeline?
Sibylline Media
November 3, 2026
ISRAEL
While Netanyahu’s departure could unlock diplomatic openings across the Middle East, renewed conflict with Iran could offer him a route to a national unity government.
BENJAMIN Netanyahu could find a route to political survival through renewed war with Iran, as Israel’s inconclusive election leaves his opponents struggling to turn their combined strength into a government.
With neither main bloc securing a parliamentary majority, Sibylline assesses that a fresh confrontation could create the conditions for a national unity government, or prolong Netanyahu’s tenure as caretaker prime minister.
For neighbouring states, that would mean more than continuity in Jerusalem.
It could also postpone diplomatic openings that his departure might create, from renewed Saudi normalisation talks to improved cooperation with Egypt and Jordan.
Megan Sutcliffe, Sibylline’s Principal MEA Analyst, says one plausible route to another Netanyahu government runs through a security crisis.
`’Renewed war with Iran would allow Netanyahu to make the case for a national unity government, potentially paving the way for a lasting coalition or, at the very least, pushing another election further down the road.,” she says.
The electoral arithmetic explains why. Netanyahu’s bloc holds 53 of the Knesset’s 120 seats, against 48 for the opposition change bloc.
Neither reaches the 61 needed for a majority. Arab-led parties hold the remaining 19, giving them potential influence that neither camp has readily translated into cooperation.
Sutcliffe says Arab turnout reached an estimated 80% in some areas, reflecting dissatisfaction with domestic security policies under National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, including the handling of violence and organised crime.
Yet several opposition parties have committed themselves to a Jewish, Zionist government, making cooperation with Arab-led parties politically difficult.
The opposition could seek their external support for a minority administration, but that would require compromises its members have so far struggled to make.
The alternative is another election, reviving the cycle of instability that repeatedly frustrated efforts to establish durable governments before Netanyahu’s return to office.
A repeat election could also weaken the opposition with many Israelis living abroad who flew home to support the change bloc potentially unable to make the journey again.

Even an opposition breakthrough would produce a fragile coalition. Its members span the centre-left and nationalist right, with sharply different economic and social priorities.
“There are sort of two unifying issues,” Sutcliffe says.
“One is anti-Netanyahu. Get Netanyahu out of office. He is a liability, and the second is ultra-Orthodox conscription.”
Exemptions for ultra-Orthodox men have become particularly contentious as prolonged deployments and repeated reserve call-ups increase pressure on the armed forces.
But agreement on sharing that burden offers little assurance of agreement elsewhere.
“I would expect us to be back at the polls within a year,” she says of a prospective change-bloc government.
Renewed war could reorder those calculations.
“Our assessment is that following the US midterms and the outcome of those midterms, we are likely going to see a resumption of US and Israeli airstrikes targeting Iran.”
These would focus on military capacity, softening Tehran’s negotiating position over its nuclear programme, regional proxies and the Strait of Hormuz.
Although Washington and Israel would likely seek a limited campaign, Sutcliffe expects an escalatory Iranian response that could broaden the conflict and push regional instability into 2027.
That could give Netanyahu grounds to appeal for political unity, drawing opposition figures into an emergency administration.
“If that were to occur, I think there are grounds for the formation of a national unity government,” she says.
“We’ve seen that several times before in Israel, but most recently after the 7th October, when Benny Gantz joined the government with the Blue and White Party.”
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Omar Khadr, Sibylline’s Middle East Analyst, says Netanyahu’s presence is itself an obstacle to improving regional relations.
“The issue for the rest of the region is not whether the change bloc is here or not. It’s basically: is Netanyahu going to be in the government?”
For Saudi Arabia, his continued leadership would leave normalisation unlikely, even if his far-right allies were excluded from a coalition.
“Riyadh still wants a credible path to a Palestinian state, at least publicly,” Khadr says.
Netanyahu would almost certainly reject Palestinian statehood even without those allies, he assesses.
Quiet, US-brokered coordination over Iran and the Houthis could continue, but shared security concerns would not automatically deliver public recognition.
Replacing Netanyahu could improve the prospects for negotiations, although Saudi demands would remain.
“It opens the door, but it does not open it fully with Saudi Arabia,” Khadr says.
“Riyadh will still want a Palestinian pathway. So you can expect some kind of a deal, but a gradual one.”
Egypt and Jordan could see immediate benefits. Khadr expects their peace treaties with Israel to endure, but says Netanyahu’s departure could ease negotiations over Gaza, border security and the West Bank.
“In Egypt, the intelligence apparatus and the army apparatus, after what happened in Gaza, are still very, very suspicious of Netanyahu and his intentions,” he says.
“Having Netanyahu out of the government will really make things partially easier for Egypt and Jordan when it comes to security arrangements concerning Gaza, Rafah, Sinai and, of course, the West Bank.”
Removing Netanyahu and his far-right allies could reduce the immediate annexation risk in the West Bank, Khadr assesses.
But settlement expansion would remain a source of friction with Jordan.
“The settlement expansion, what happened in the last 40 years, is basically paving a nightmare scenario for the West Bank, even with a very liberal government,” he says.
“The problem here is structural, not a matter of policy.”
Khadr expects ties with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain to survive, while Netanyahu’s departure could ease public engagement and make Gulf support for Gaza’s reconstruction more plausible.
He also sees better prospects for a US-brokered agreement with Syria.
“If there is a more cooperative Israeli government and also a very welcoming US administration … it is possible that we will see some kind of a security deal between Damascus and Tel Aviv.”
Sutcliffe expects an alternative government to remain hawkish towards Iran, but less assertive militarily and less supportive of extensive buffer zones.
Khadr anticipates little immediate change in Israel’s military presence in Gaza, southern Lebanon and Syria.
Netanyahu’s departure could therefore ease diplomacy without transforming Israel’s security priorities.
His survival through war could prolong the diplomatic impasse, while exposing neighbouring countries to renewed retaliation and disruption.
“Security first is a cross-party consensus in Israel,” Khadr says.
“It doesn’t matter whether Bibi is out or Bibi is in.”